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BOUNDED RATIONAL DECISION-MAKING FROM
ELEMENTARY COMPUTATIONS THAT REDUCE
UNCERTAINTY
SEBASTIAN GOTTWALD, DANIEL A. BRAUN
Abstract. In its most basic form, decision-making can be viewed as a com-
putational process that progressively eliminates alternatives, thereby reducing
uncertainty. Such processes are generally costly, meaning that the amount of
uncertainty that can be reduced is limited by the amount of available compu-
tational resources. Here, we introduce the notion of elementary computation
based on a fundamental principle for probability transfers that reduce uncer-
tainty. Elementary computations can be considered as the inverse of Pigou-
Dalton transfers applied to probability distributions, closely related to the
concepts of majorization, T-transforms, and generalized entropies that induce
a preorder on the space of probability distributions. As a consequence we can
define resource cost functions that are order-preserving and therefore mono-
tonic with respect to the uncertainty reduction. This leads to a comprehensive
notion of decision-making processes with limited resources. Along the way, we
prove several new results on majorization theory, as well as on entropy and
divergence measures.
1. Introduction
In rational decision theory, uncertainty may have multiple sources that ulti-
mately share the commonality that they reflect a lack of knowledge on the part
of the decision-maker about the environment. A paramount example is the per-
fectly rational decision-maker [99] that has a probabilistic model of the environ-
ment and chooses its actions so as to maximize the expected utility entailed by
the different choices. When we consider bounded rational decision-makers [87], we
may add another source of uncertainty arising from the decision-maker’s limited
processing capabilities, since the decision-maker will not only accept a single best
choice, but will accept any satisficing option. Today, bounded rationality is an
active research topic that crosses multiple scientific fields such as economics, po-
litical science, decision theory, game theory, computer science, and neuroscience
[81, 66, 59, 12, 31, 63, 45, 89, 101, 42, 91, 92, 90, 46, 16, 70, 58, 1, 30], where
uncertainty is one of the most important common denominators.
Uncertainty is often equated with Shannon entropy in information theory [85],
measuring the average number of yes/no-questions that have to be answered to re-
solve the uncertainty. Even though Shannon entropy has many desirable properties,
there are plenty of alternative suggestions for entropy measures in the literature,
known as generalized entropies, such as Re´nyi entropy [77] or Tsallis entropy [95].
Closely related to entropies are divergence measures, which express how probability
distributions differ from a given reference distribution. If the reference distribution
is uniform then divergence measures can be expressed in terms of entropy measures,
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which is why divergences can be viewed as generalizations of entropy, for example
the Kullback-Leibler divergence [52] generalizing Shannon entropy.
Here, we introduce the concept of elementary computation based on a slightly
stronger notion of uncertainty than is expressed by Shannon entropy, or any other
generalized entropy alone, but is equivalent to all of them combined. Equating
decision-making with uncertainty reduction, this leads to a new comprehensive
view of decision-making with limited resources. Our main contributions can be
summarized as follows:
(i) Based on a fundamental concept of probability transfers related to the
Pigou-Dalton principle of welfare economics [23], we promote a generalized
notion of uncertainty reduction of a probability distribution that we call el-
ementary computation. This leads to a natural definition of cost functions
that quantify the resource costs for uncertainty reduction necessary for
decision-making. We generalize these concepts to arbitrary reference dis-
tributions. In particular, we define Pigou-Dalton-type transfers for proba-
bility distributions relative to a reference or prior distribution, which induce
a preorder that is slightly stronger than Kullback-Leibler divergence, but is
equivalent to the notion of divergence given by all f -divergences combined.
We prove several new characterizations of the underlying concept, known
as relative majorization.
(ii) An interesting property of cost functions is their behavior under coarse-
graining, which plays an important role in decision-making and formalizes
the general notion of making abstractions. More precisely, if a decision in a
set Ω is split up into two steps by partitioning Ω =
⋃
iAi and first deciding
in the set of (coarse-grained) partitions {Ai}i and secondly choosing a fine-
grained option inside the selected partition Ai, then it is an important
question how the cost for the total decision-making process differs from the
sum of the costs in each step. We show that f -divergences are superadditive
with respect to coarse-graining, which means that decision-making costs can
potentially be reduced by splitting up the decision into multiple steps. In
this regard, we find evidence that the well-known property of Kullback-
Leibler divergence of being additive under coarse-graining might be viewed
as describing the minimal amount of processing cost that cannot be reduced
by a more intelligent decision-making strategy.
(iii) We define bounded rational decision-makers as decision-making processes
that are optimizing a given utility function under a constraint on the cost
function, or minimizing the cost function under a minimal requirement on
expected utility. As a special case for Shannon-type information costs,
we arrive at information-theoretic bounded rationality, which may form a
normative baseline for bounded-optimal decision-making in the absence of
process-dependent constraints. We show that bounded-optimal posteriors
with informational costs trace a path through probability space that can
itself be seen as an anytime decision-making process, where each step opti-
mally trades off utility and processing costs.
(iv) We show that Bayesian inference can be seen as a decision-making process
with limited resources given by the number of available datapoints.
Section 2 deals with (i) and (ii), aiming at a general characterization of decision-
making in terms of uncertainty reduction. Item (iii) is covered in Section 3, deriving
information-theoretic bounded rationality as a special case. Section 4 illustrates the
concepts with an example including item (iv). Sections 5 and 6 contain a general
discussion and concluding remarks.
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Figure 1. Decision-making as search in a set of options. At the
expense of more and more resources, the number of uncertain op-
tions is progressively reduced until x∗ is the only remaining option.
Notation
Let R denote the real numbers, R+ := [0,∞) the set of non-negative real num-
bers, and Q the rational numbers. We write |A| for the number of elements con-
tained in a countable set A, and B \ A for the set difference, that is the set of
elements in B that are not in A. PΩ denotes the set of probability distributions
on a set Ω, in particular, any p ∈ PΩ is normalized so that p(Ω) = Ep[1] = 1.
Random variables are denoted by capital letters X,Y, Z, while their explicit values
are denoted by small letters x, y, z. For the probability distribution of a random
variable X we write p(X), and p(x) for the values of p(X). Correspondingly, the
expectation E[f(X)] is also written as Ep(X)[f(X)], Ep(X)[f ], or Ep[f ]. We also
write 〈f〉p := 1n
∑n
i=1 f(xn), to denote the approximation of Ep[f ] by an average
over samples {x1, . . . , xn} from p ∈ PΩ.
2. Decision-making with limited resources
In this section, we develop the notion of a decision-making process with limited
resources following the simple assumption that any decision-making process
(i) reduces uncertainty
(ii) by spending resources.
Starting from an intuitive interpretation of uncertainty and resource costs, these
concepts are refined incrementally until a precise definition of a decision-making
process is given at the end of this section (Definition 2.11) in terms of elemen-
tary computations. Here, a decision-making process is a comprehensive term that
describes all kinds of biological as well as artificial systems that are searching for
solutions to given problems, for example a human decision-maker that burns calo-
ries while thinking, or a computer that uses electric energy to run an algorithm.
However, resources do not necessarily refer to a real consumable quantity but can
also represent more explicit resources (like time) as a proxy, for example the number
of binary comparisons in a search algorithm, the number of forward simulations in
a reinforcement learning algorithm, the number of samples in a Monte Carlo algo-
rithm, or, even more abstractly, they can express the limited availability of some
source of information, like for example the number of datapoints that are available
to an inference algorithm (see Section 4).
2.1. Uncertainty reduction by eliminating options. In its most basic form,
the concept of decision-making can be formalized as the process of looking for a
decision x ∈ Ω in a discrete set of options Ω = {x1, . . . , xN}. We say that a
decision x ∈ Ω is certain, if repeated queries of the decision-maker will result in
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the same decision, and it is uncertain, if repeated queries can result in different
decisions. Uncertainty reduction then corresponds to reducing the amount of un-
certain options. Hence, a decision-making process that transitions from a space
Ω of options to a strictly smaller subset A ( Ω reduces the amount of uncertain
options from N = |Ω| to NA := |A| < N , with the possible goal to eventually find a
single certain decision x∗. Such a process is generally costly, the more uncertainty
is reduced the more resources it costs (Figure 1). The explicit mapping between
uncertainty reduction and resource cost depends on the details of the underlying
process and on which explicit quantity is taken as the resource. For example, if
the resource is given by time (or any monotone function of time), then a search
algorithm that eliminates options sequentially until the target value is found (lin-
ear search) is less cost efficient than an algorithm that takes a sorted list and in
each step removes half of the options by comparing the mid point to the target
(logarithmic search). Abstractly, any real-valued function C on the power set of Ω
that satisfies C(A′) < C(A) whenever A ( A′ might be used as a cost function in
the sense that C(A) quantifies the expenses of reducing the uncertainty from Ω to
A ⊂ Ω.
In utility theory decision-making is modelled as an optimization process that
maximizes a so-called utility function U : Ω → R (which can itself be an expected
utility with respect to a probabilistic model of the environment, in the sense of
von Neumann and Morgenstern [99]). A decision-maker that is optimizing a given
utility function U obtains a utility of 1NA
∑
x∈A U(x) ≥ 1N
∑
x∈Ω U(x) on average
after reducing the amount of uncertain options from N to NA < N (see Figure
2). A decision-maker that completely reduces uncertainty by finding the optimum
x∗ = argmaxx∈ΩU(x) is called rational (w.l.o.g. we can assume that x
∗ is unique,
by redefining Ω in the case when it is not). Since uncertainty reduction generally
comes with a cost, a utility optimizing decision-maker with limited resources, cor-
respondingly called bounded rational (see Section 3), in contrast will obtain only
uncertain decisions from a subset A ⊂ Ω. Such decision-makers seek satisfactory
rather than optimal solutions, for example by taking the first option that satisfies a
minimal utility requirement, which Herbert Simon calls a satisficing solution [87].
Summarizing, we conclude that a decision-making process with decision space
Ω that successively eliminates options can be represented by a mapping φ between
subsets of Ω, together with a cost function C that quantifies the total expenses of
arriving at a given subset,
Ω −→ · · · −→ A′ −→ φ(A′) −→ · · · −→ A (2.1)
such that
Ω ⊃ A′ ⊃ φ(A′) ⊃ A, 0 = C(Ω) < C(A′) < C(φ(A′)) < C(A) , (2.2)
For example, a rational decision-maker can afford C({x∗}), whereas a decision-
maker with limited resources can typically only afford uncertainty reduction with
cost C(A) < C({x∗}).
From a probabilistic perspective, a decision-making process as described above
is a transition from a uniform probability distribution over N options to a uniform
probability distribution over N ′ < N options, that converges to the Dirac measure
δx∗ centered at x
∗ in the fully rational limit. From this point of view, the restriction
to uniform distributions is artificial. A decision-maker that is uncertain about
the optimal decision x∗ might indeed have a bias towards a subset A without
completely excluding other options (the ones in Ac = Ω\A), so that the behavior
must be properly described by a probability distribution p ∈ PΩ. Therefore, in
the following section, we extend (2.1) and (2.2) to transitions between probability
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Figure 2. Decision-making as utility optimization process.
distributions. In particular, we must replace the power set of Ω by the space of
probability distributions on Ω, denoted by PΩ.
2.2. Probabilistic decision-making. Let Ω be a discrete decision space ofN = |Ω|<∞
options, so that PΩ consists of discrete distributions p, often represented by prob-
ability vectors p = (p1, . . . , pN ). However, many of the concepts presented in this
and the following section can be generalized to the continuous case [62, 44].
Intuitively, the uncertainty contained in a distribution p ∈ PΩ is related to the
relative inequality of its entries, the more similar its entries are, the higher the
uncertainty. This means that uncertainty is increased by moving some probability
weight from a more likely option to a less likely option. It turns out that this
simple idea leads to a concept widely known as majorization [36, 10, 72, 13, 62,
11], which has roots in the economic literature of the early 19th century [60, 74,
23], where it was introduced to describe income inequality, later known as the
Pigou-Dalton Principle of Transfers. Here, the operation of moving weight from a
more likely to a less likely option corresponds to the transfer of income from one
individual of a population to a relatively poorer individual (also known as a Robin
Hood operation [10]). Since a decision-making process can be viewed as a sequence
of uncertainty reducing computations, we call the inverse of such a Pigou-Dalton
transfer an elementary computation.
Definition 2.1 (Elementary computation). A transformation on PΩ of the form
Tε : p 7→ (p1, . . . , pm + ε, . . . , pn − ε, . . . , pN ) , (2.3)
where m,n are such that pm ≤ pn, and 0 < ε ≤ pn−pm2 , is called a Pigou-Dalton
transfer (see Figure 3). We call its inverse T−1ε an elementary computation.
Since making two probability values more similar or more dissimilar are the
only two possibilities to minimally transform a probability distribution, elementary
computations are the most basic principle of how uncertainty is reduced. Hence,
we conclude that a distribution p′ has more uncertainty than a distribution p if
and only if p can be obtained from p′ by finitely many elementary computations
(and permutations, which are not considered an elementary computation due to
the choice of ε).
Definition 2.2 (Uncertainty). We say that p′ ∈ PΩ contains more uncertainty
than p ∈ PΩ, denoted by
p′ ≺ p , (2.4)
if and only if p can be obtained from p′ by a finite number of elementary computa-
tions and permutations.
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Tε
ε
Ω
p′ 
higher uncertainty less uncertainty
Ω
p
Figure 3. A Pigou-Dalton transfer as given by Equation (2.3).
The transfer of probability from a more likely to a less likely option
increases uncertainty.
Note that, mathematically this defines a preorder on PΩ, i.e. a reflexive (p ≺ p for
all p ∈ PΩ) and transitive (if p′′ ≺ p′, p′ ≺ p then p′′ ≺ p for all p, p′, p′′ ∈ PΩ)
binary relation.
In the literature, there are different names for the relation between p and p′
expressed by Definition 2.2, for example p′ is called more mixed than p [79], more
disordered than p [78], more chaotic than p [13], or an average of p [36]. Most
commonly however, p is said to majorize p′, which started with the early influences
of Muirhead [65], and Hardy, Littlewood, and Po´lya [36] and was developed by many
authors into the field of majorization theory (a standard reference is by Marshall,
Olkin, and Arnold [62]), with far reaching applications until today, especially in
nonequilibrium thermodynamics and quantum information theory [15, 41, 34].
There are plenty of equivalent (arguably less intuitive) characterizations of p ≺
p′, some of which we are summarizing below. However, one characterization makes
use of a concept very closely related to Pigou-Dalton transfers, known as T-transforms
[13, 62], which expresses the fact that moving some weight from a more likely op-
tion to a less likely option is equivalent to taking (weighted) averages of the two
probability values. More precisely, a T-transform is a linear operator on PΩ with a
matrix of the form T = (1− λ)I+ λΠ, where I denotes the identity matrix on RN ,
Π denotes a permutation matrix of two elements, and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. If Π permutes
pm and pn, then (Tp)k = pk for all k 6∈ {m,n}, and
(Tp)m = (1− λ)pm + λpn , (Tp)n = λpm + (1− λ)pn . (2.5)
Hence, a T-transform considers any two probability values pm and pn of a given
p ∈ PΩ, calculates their weighted averages with weights (1−λ, λ) and (λ, 1−λ), and
replaces the original values with these averages. From (2.5) it follows immediately
that a T-transform with parameter 0 < λ ≤ 12 and a permutation Π of pm, pn with
pm ≤ pn is a Pigou-Dalton transfer with ε = (pn − pm)λ. Also allowing 12 ≤ λ ≤ 1
means that T-transfers include permutations, in particular, p′ ≺ p if and only if p′
can be derived from p by successive applications of finitely many T-transforms
Due to a classic result by Hardy, Littlewood and Po´lya [36, p.49], this character-
ization can be stated in an even simpler form by using doubly stochastic matrices,
i.e. matrices A = (Aij)i,j with Aij ≥ 0 and
∑
iAij = 1 =
∑
j Aij for all i, j. By
writing xA := ATx for all x ∈ RN , and e := (1, . . . , 1), these conditions are often
stated as
Aij ≥ 0 , Ae = e , eA = e . (2.6)
Note that doubly stochastic matrices can be viewed as generalizations of T-transforms
in the sense that a T-transform takes an average of two entries, whereas if p′ = pA
with a doubly stochastic matrix A, then p′j =
∑
iAijpi is a convex combination,
or a weighted average, of p with coefficients (Aij)i for each j. This is also, why
p′ is then called more mixed than p [79]. Therefore, similar to T-transforms, we
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Figure 4. Comparability of probability distributions in N = 3.
The region in the center consists of all p′ that are majorized by
p, i.e. p  p′, whereas the outer region consists of all p′ that
majorize p, p ≺ p′. The bright regions are not comparable to p.
(a) p = ( 13 ,
1
2 ,
1
6 ), (b) p = (
1
2 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ).
might expect that if p′ is the result of an application of a doubly stochastic ma-
trix, p′ = pA, then p′ is an average of p and therefore contains more uncertainty
than p. This is exactly what is expressed by characterization (iii) in the following
theorem. A similar characterization of p′ ≺ p is that p′ must be given by a convex
combination of permutations of the elements of p (see property (iv) below).
Without having the concept of majorization, Schur proved that functions of
the form p 7→∑i f(pi) with a convex function f are monotone with respect to the
application of a doubly stochastic matrix [83] (see property (v) below). Functions of
this form are an important class of cost functions for probabilistic decision-makers,
as we will discuss in Example 2.2.
Theorem 2.3 (Characterizations of p′ ≺ p [62]). For p, p′ ∈ PΩ, the following are
equivalent:
(i) p′ ≺ p, i.e. p′ contains more uncertainty than p (Definition 2.2)
(ii) p′ is the result of finitely many T-transforms applied to p
(iii) p′ = pA for a doubly stochastic matrix A
(iv) p′ =
∑K
k=1 θkΠk(p) where K ∈ N,
∑K
k=1 θk = 1, θk ≥ 0, and Πk is a per-
mutation for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}
(v)
∑N
i=1 f(p
′
i) ≤
∑N
i=1 f(pi) for all continuous convex functions f
(vi)
∑k
i=1(p
′
i)
↓ ≤ ∑ki=1 p↓i for all k ∈ {1, . . . , N−1}, where p↓ denotes the de-
creasing rearrangement of p.
As argued above, the equivalence between (i) and (ii) is straight-forward. The
equivalences between (ii), (iii), and (vi) are due to Muirhead [65] and Hardy,
Littlewood, and Po´lya [36]. The implication (v) ⇒ (iii) is due to Karamata [47]
and Hardy, Littlewood, and Po´lya [37], whereas (iii)⇒ (v) goes back to Schur [83].
Mathematically, (iv) means that p′ belongs to the convex hull of all permutations
of the entries of p, and the equivalence (iii) ⇔ (iv) is known as the Birkhoff-
von Neumann theorem. Here, we have stated all relations for probability vectors
p ∈ PΩ, even though they are usually stated for all p, p′ ∈ RN with the additional
requirement that
∑N
i=1 pi =
∑N
i=1 p
′
i.
Condition (vi) is the classical and most commonly used definition of majorization
[60, 36, 62], since it is often the easiest to check in practical examples. For example,
from (vi) it immediately follows that uniform distributions over N options contain
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5. Examples of cost functions for decision spaces with
three elements (N = 3): (a) Shannon entropy, (b) Tsallis entropy
of order α = 4, (c) Re´nyi entropy of order α = −3.5.
more uncertainty than uniform distributions over N ′ < N options, since we have∑k
i=1
1
N =
k
N 6
k
N ′ =
∑k
i=1
1
N ′ for all k < N , i.e. for N ≥ 3 it follows that(
1
N , . . . ,
1
N
) ≺ ( 1N−1 , . . . , 1N−1 , 0) ≺ ( 12 , 12 , 0, . . . , 0) ≺ (1, 0 . . . , 0) . (2.7)
In particular, if A ⊂ A′ ⊂ Ω, then the uniform distribution over A contains less
uncertainty than the uniform distribution over A′, which shows that the notion of
uncertainty introduced in Definition 2.2 is indeed a generalizatin of the notion of
uncertainty given by the number of uncertain options introduced in the previous
section.
Note that, ≺ only being a preorder on PΩ, in general, two distributions p′, p ∈ PΩ
are not necessarily comparable, i.e. we can have both p′ 6≺ p and p 6≺ p′. In
Figure 4, we visualize the regions of all comparable distributions for two exemplary
distributions on a three-dimensional decision space (N = 3), represented on the
two-dimensional simplex of probability vectors p = (p1, p2, p3). For example,
p =
(
1
2 ,
1
4 ,
1
4
)
, p′ =
(
2
5 ,
2
5 ,
1
5
)
can not be compared under ≺, since 12 > 25 , but 34 < 45 .
Cost functions can now be generalized to probabilistic decision-making by noting
that the property C(A′) < C(A) whenever A ( A′ in (2.2) means that C is strictly
monotonic with respect to the preorder given by set inclusion.
Definition 2.4 (Cost functions on PΩ). We say that a function C : PΩ → R+ is a
cost function, if it is strictly monotonically increasing with respect to the preorder
≺, i.e. if
p′ ≺ p ⇒ C(p′) ≤ C(p) , (2.8)
with equality only if p and p′ are equivalent, p′ ∼ p, which is defined as p′ ≺ p
and p ≺ p′. Moreover, for a parametrized family of posteriors (pr)r∈I , we say
that r is a resource parameter with respect to a cost function C, if the mapping
I 7→ R+, r 7→ C(pr) is strictly monotonically increasing.
Since monotonic functions with respect to majorization were first studied by Schur
[83], functions with this property are usually called (strictly) Schur-convex [62,
Ch. 3].
Example (Generalized entropies). From (v) in Theorem 2.3 it follows that functions
of the form
C(p) =
N∑
i=1
f(pi), (2.9)
where f is strictly convex, are examples of cost functions. Since many entropy
measures used in the literature can be seen to be special cases of (2.9) (with a
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concave f), functions of this form are often called generalized entropies [18]. In
particular, for the choice f(t) = t log t, we have C(p) = −H(p), where H(p) denotes
the Shannon entropy of p. Thus, if p′ contains more uncertainty than p in the sense
of Definition 2.2 (p′ ≺ p) then the Shannon entropy of p′ is larger than the Shannon
entropy of p and therefore p′ contains also more uncertainty in the sense of classical
information theory than p. Similarly, for f(t) = − log(t) we obtain the (negative)
Burg entropy, and for functions of the form f(t) = ±tα for α ∈ R\{0, 1} we get
the (negative) Tsallis entropy, where the sign is chosen depending on α such that
f is convex (see e.g. [32] for more examples). Moreover, the composition of any
(strictly) monotonically increasing function g with (2.9) generates another class of
cost functions, which contains for example the (negative) Re´nyi entropy [77]. Note
also that entropies of the form (2.9) are special cases of Csisza´r’s f-divergences [20]
for uniform reference distributions (see Example 2.3 below). In Figure 5, several
examples of cost functions are shown for N = 3. In this case, the 2-dimensional
probability simplex PΩ is given by the triangle in R3 with edges (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0),
and (0, 0, 1). Cost functions are visualized in terms of their level sets.
We prove in Proposition A.1 in the appendix that all cost functions of the form
(2.9) are superadditive with respect to coarse-graining. This seems to be a new result
and an improvement upon the fact that generalized entropies (and f -divergences)
satisfy information monotonicity [5]. More precisely, if a decision in Ω, represented
by a random variable Z, is split up into two steps by partitioning Ω =
⋃
i∈I Ai and
first deciding about the partition i ∈ I, correspondingly described by a random
variable X with values in I, and then choosing an option inside of the selected
partition Ai, represented by a random variable Y , i.e. Z = (X,Y ), then
C(Z) ≥ C(X) + C(Y |X) , (2.10)
where C(X) := C(p(X)) and C(Y |X) := Ep(X)[C(p(Y |X))]. For symmetric cost
functions (such as (2.9)) this is equivalent to
C(p1, . . . , pN ) ≥ C(p1 + p2, p3, . . . , pN ) + (p1+p2)C( p1p1+p2 ,
p2
p1+p2
) . (2.11)
The case of equality in (2.10) and (2.11) (see Figure 6) is sometimes called separabil-
ity [51], strong additivity [21], or recursivity [4], and it is often used to characterize
Shannon entropy [26, 96, 48, 55, 77, 2]. In fact, we also show in the appendix
(Proposition A.2) that cost functions C that are additive under coarse-graining are
proportional to the negative Shannon entropy −H. See also Example 2.3 in the next
section, where we discuss the generalization to arbitrary reference distributions.
We can now refine the notion of a decision-making process introduced in the
previous section as a mapping φ together with a cost function C satisfying (2.2).
Instead of simply mapping from sets A′ to smaller subsets A ( A′ by successively
eliminating options, we now allow φ to be a mapping between probability distri-
butions such that φ(p) can be obtained from p by a finite number of elementary
computations (without permutations), and we require C to be a cost function on
PΩ, so that
p  φ(p), C(p) < C(φ(p)) ∀p ∈ PΩ . (2.12)
Here, C(p) quantifies the total costs of arriving at a distribution p, and p′  p
means that p′ ≺ p and p 6≺ p′. In other words, a decision-making process can be
viewed as traversing probability space by moving pieces of probability from one
option to another option such that uncertainty is reduced.
Up to now we have ignored one important property of a decision-making process,
the distribution q with minimal cost, i.e. satisfying C(q) ≤ C(p) for all p, which
must be identified with the initial distribution of a decision-making process with
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+ C(Y |X )C(X )C(X,Y ) =
Figure 6. Additivity under coarse-graining. If the cost for Z =
(X,Y ) is the sum of the costs for X and the cost for Y given X,
then the cost function is proportional to Shannon entropy.
cost function C. As one might expect (see Figure 5), it turns out that all cost
functions according to Definition 2.4 have the same minimal element.
Proposition 2.5 (Uniform distributions are minimal). The uniform distribution
( 1N , . . . ,
1
N ) is the unique minimal element in PΩ with respect to ≺, i.e.(
1
N , . . . ,
1
N
) ≺ p ∀p ∈ PΩ . (2.13)
Once (2.13) is established, it follows from (2.8) that C(( 1N , . . . ,
1
N )) ≤ C(p) for all p,
in particular the uniform distribution corresponds to the initial state of all decision-
making processes with cost function C satisfying (2.12). In particular, it contains
the maximum amount of uncertainty with respect to any entropy measure of the
form (2.9), known as the second Khinchin axiom [51], e.g. for Shannon entropy
0 ≤ H(p) ≤ logN . Proposition 2.5 follows from characterization (iv) in Theorem
2.3 after noticing that every p ∈ PΩ can be transformed to a uniform distribution
by permuting its elements cyclically (see Proposition A.3 in the appendix for a
detailed proof).
Regarding the possibility that a decision-maker may have prior information, for
example originating from the experience of previous comparable decision-making
tasks, the assumption of a uniform initial distribution seems to be artificial. There-
fore, in the following section we arrive at the final notion of a decision-making
process by extending the results of this section to allow for arbitrary initial distri-
butions.
2.3. Decision-making with prior knowledge. From the discussion at the end
of the previous section we conclude that, in full generality, a decision-maker tran-
sitions from an initial probability distribution q ∈ PΩ, called prior, to a terminal
distribution p ∈ PΩ, called posterior. Note that, since once eliminated options are
excluded from the rest of the decision-making process, a posterior p must be abso-
lutely continuous with respect to the prior q, denoted by p  q, i.e. p(x) can be
non-zero for a given x ∈ Ω only if q(x) is non-zero.
The notion of uncertainty (Definition 2.2) can be generalized with respect to a
non-uniform prior q ∈ PΩ by viewing the probabilities qi as the probabilities Q(Ai)
of partitions Ai of an underlying elementary probability space Ω˜ =
⋃
iAi of equally
likely elements under Q, in particular Q represents q as the uniform distribution on
Ω˜ (see Figure 7). The similarity of the entries of the corresponding representation
P ∈ PΩ˜ of any p ∈ PΩ (its uncertainty) then contains information about how close
p is to q, which we call the relative uncertainty of p with respect to q (Definition
2.6 below).
The formal construction is as follows: Let p, q ∈ PΩ be such that p  q and
qi ∈ Q. The case when qi ∈ R then follows from a simple approximation of each
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q
1/6
1/3
1/ 2
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Ω˜
Q
Ω
p
Ω˜
P
A1⏟ A2 ⏟A3 A1⏟ A2 ⏟A3
1/6
1/3
1/ 2
2 /3
1/6
1/3
1/6
1/3
ΛqΛq
Figure 7. Representation of q and p by Q and P on Ω˜ (Example
2.3), such that the probabilities qi and pi are given by the proba-
bilities of the partitions Ai with respect to Q and P , respectively.
entry by a rational number. Let α ∈ N be such that α qi ∈ N for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
for example α could be chosen as the least common multiple of the denominators of
the qi. The underlying elementary probability space Ω˜ then consists of α elements
and there exists a partitioning {Ai}i=1,...,N of Ω˜ such that
|Ai| = α qi ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N} , (2.14)
where Q denotes the uniform distribution on Ω˜. In particular, it follows that
Q(Ai) =
|Ai|∑
j=1
1
α
= qi ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N} , (2.15)
i.e. Q represents q in Ω˜ with respect to the partitioning {Ai}i. Similarly, any
p ∈ PΩ can be represented as a distribution on Ω˜ by requiring that P (Ai) = pi for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and letting P to be constant inside of each partition, i.e. similar
to (2.15) we have P (Ai) = |Ai|P (ω) = pi for all ω ∈ Ai and therefore by (2.14)
P (ω) =
1
α
pi
qi
∀ω ∈ Ai . (2.16)
Note that, if qi = 0 then pi = 0 by absolute continuity (p  q) in which case we
can either exclude option i from Ω or set P (ω) = 0.
Example. For a prior q = ( 16 ,
1
2 ,
1
3 ) we put α = 6, so that Ω˜ = {ω1, . . . , ω6} should
be partitioned as Ω˜ = {ω1} ∪ {ω2, ω3, ω4} ∪ {ω5, ω6}. Then qi corresponds to the
probability of the i-th partition under the uniform distribution Q = 16 (1, . . . , 1),
while p = ( 16 ,
3
4 ,
1
12 ) is represented on Ω˜ by P =
(
1
6 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
24 ,
1
24 ) (see Figure 7).
Importantly, if the components of the representation Λqp := P in PΩ˜ given by
(2.16) are similar to each other, i.e. if P is close to uniform, then the components
of p must be very similar to the components of q, which we express by the concept
of relative uncertainty.
Definition 2.6 (Uncertainty relative to q). We say that p′ ∈ PΩ contains more
uncertainty with respect to a prior q ∈ PΩ than p ∈ PΩ, denoted by p′ ≺q p, if and
only if Λqp
′ contains more uncertainty than Λqp, i.e.
p′ ≺q p :⇔ Λqp′ ≺ Λqp (2.17)
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where Λq : PΩ → PΩ˜, p 7→ P is given by (2.16).
As we will show in Theorem 2.7 below, it turns out that ≺q coincides with a
known concept called q-majorization [97], majorization relative to q [44, 62], or
mixing distance [80]. Due to the lack of a characterization by partial sums, it is
usually defined as a generalization of characterization (iii) in Theorem 2.3, that is
p′ is q-majorized by p iff p′ = pA, where A is a so-called q-stochastic matrix, which
means that it is a stochastic matrix (Ae = e) with qA = q. In particular, ≺q does
not depend on the choice of α in the definition of Λq. Here, we provide two new
characterizations of q-majorization, the one given by Definition 2.6, and one using
partial sums generalizing the original definition of majorization.
Theorem 2.7 (Characterizations of p′ ≺q p). The following are equivalent
(i) p′ ≺q p, i.e. p′ contains more uncertainty relative to q than p (Def. 2.6)
(ii) Λqp can be obtained from Λqp
′ by a finite number of elementary computa-
tions and permutations on PΩ˜
(iii) p′ = pA for a q-stochastic matrix A, i.e. Ae = e and qA = q
(iv)
∑N
i=1 qif
(p′i
qi
) ≤∑Ni=1 qif(piqi ) for all continuous convex functions f
(v)
∑l−1
i=1(p
′
i)
↓+aq(k, l)(p′l)
↓ ≤ ∑l−1i=1 p↓i +aq(k, l)p↓l for all k, l ∈ N that satisfy
α
∑l−1
i=1 q
↓
i ≤ k ≤ α
∑l
i=1 q
↓
i and 1 ≤ l ≤ N , where the arrows indicate that
(p↓i /q
↓
i )i is ordered decreasingly, and aq(k, l) := (
k
α −
∑l−1
i=1 q
↓
i )/q
↓
l .
To prove that (i), (iii), and (v) are equivalent (see Proposition A.4 in the appen-
dix), we use of the fact that Λq : PΩ → PΩ˜ has a left inverse Λ−1q : Λq(PΩ) → PΩ.
This can be verified by simply multiplying the corresponding matrices given in the
proof of Proposition A.4. The equivalence betweeen (iii) and (iv) is shown in [44]
(see also [80, 62]). Characterization (ii) follows immediately from Definition 2.2
and Definition 2.6.
As required from the discussion at the end of the previous section, q is indeed
minimal with respect to ≺q, which means that it contains the most amount of
uncertainty with respect to itself.
Proposition 2.8 (The prior is minimal). The prior q ∈ PΩ is the unique minimal
element in PΩ with respect to ≺q, that is
q ≺q p ∀p ∈ PΩ . (2.18)
This follows more or less directly from Proposition 2.5 and the equivalence of (i)
and (iii) in Theorem 2.7 (see Proposition A.5 in the appendix for a detailed proof).
Order-preserving functions with respect to ≺q generalize cost functions intro-
duced in the previous section (Definition 2.4). According to Proposition 2.8, such
functions have a unique minimum given by the prior q. Since cost functions are
used in Definition 2.11 below to quantify the expenses of a decision-making process,
we require their minimum to be zero, which can always be achieved by redefining
a given cost function by an additive constant.
Definition 2.9 (Cost functions relative to q). We say that a function Cq : PΩ → R+
is a cost function relative to q, if Cq(q) = 0, if it is invariant under relabeling (qi, pi)i,
and if it is strictly monotonically increasing with respect to the preorder ≺q, that
is if
p′ ≺q p ⇒ Cq(p′) ≤ Cq(p) , (2.19)
with equality only if p′ ∼q p, i.e. if p′ ≺q p and p ≺q p′. Moreover, for a parametrized
family of posteriors (pr)r∈I , we say that r is a resource parameter with respect to
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Figure 8. Examples of cost functions for N = 3 relative to q =
( 13 ,
1
2 ,
1
6 ). (a) Kullback-Leibler divergence, (b) Squared `
2 distance,
(c) Tsallis relative entropy of order α = 3.0.
a cost function Cq, if the mapping I 7→ R+, r 7→ Cq(pr) is strictly monotonically
increasing.
Similar to generalized entropy functions discussed in Example 2.2, in the litera-
ture there are many examples of relative cost functions, usually called divergences
or measures of divergence.
Example (f -divergences). From (iv) in Theorem 2.7 it follows that functions of the
form
Cq(p) :=
N∑
i=1
qi f
(pi
qi
)
, (2.20)
where f is continuous and strictly convex with f(1) = 0, are examples of cost
functions relative to q. Many well-known divergence measures can be seen to belong
to this class of relative cost functions, also known as Csisza´r’s f -divergences [20]:
the Kullback-Leibler divergence (or relative entropy), the squared `2 distance, the
Hartley entropy, the Burg entropy, the Tsallis entropy, and many more [32, 21] (see
Figure 8 for visualizations of some of them in N = 3 relative to a non-uniform
prior).
As a generalizition of Proposition A.1 (superadditivity of generalized entropies),
we prove in Proposition A.6 in the appendix that f -divergences are superadditive
under coarse-graining, that is, for Z = (X,Y )
Cq(Z) ≥ Cq(X) + Cq(Y |X) (2.21)
whenever Cq(X) := Cq(X)(p(X)) and Cq(Y |X) := Ep(X)[Cq(Y |X)(p(Y |X))]. This
generalizes (2.10) to the case of a non-uniform prior. Similar to entropies, the
case of equality in (2.21) is sometimes called composition rule [40], chain rule [57],
or recursivity [21], and is often used to characterize Kullback-Leibler divergence
[40, 63, 21, 57].
Indeed, we also show in the appendix (Proposition A.7) that all additive cost
functions with respect to q are proportional to Kullback-Leibler divergence (relative
entropy). This goes back to Hobson’s modification [40] of Shannon’s original proof
[85], after establishing the following monotonicity property for uniform distribu-
tions: If f(M,N) denotes the cost CuN (uM ) of a uniform distribution uM over M
elements relative to a uniform distribution uN over N ≥ M elements, then (see
Figure 9)
f(M ′, N) ≤ f(M,N) ∀M ≤M ′ ≤ N ,
f(M,N) ≥ f(M,N ′) ∀M ≤ N ′ ≤ N . (2.22)
Note that, even though our proof of Proposition A.7 uses additivity under coarse
graining to show the monotonicity property (2.22), it is easy to see that any relative
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Ω
(a)
uN′ 
(b) f (M,N ) > f (M,N′ )
uM
uN
uM
uN
uM
uN
uM′ 
f (M′ ,N ) < f (M,N )
Ω Ω Ω
Figure 9. Monotonicity property (2.22). (a) The cost is higher
when more uncertainty has been reduced. (b) If the posterior is
the same, then it is cheaper to start from a prior with fewer options.
cost function of the form (2.20) also satisfies (2.22) by using the convexity of f in
the form f(t) ≤ tsf(s) + (1− ts )f(0) with t = N
′
M <
N
M = s.
In terms of decision-making, superadditivity under coarse-graining means that
decision-making costs can potentially be reduced by splitting up the decision into
multiple steps, for example by a more intelligent search strategy. For example,
if N = 2k for some k ∈ N and Cq is superadditive, then the cost for reducing
uncertainty to a single option, i.e. p = (1, 0, . . . , 0), when starting from a uniform
distribution q, satisfies
Cq(p) ≥ Cq2(1, 0) + CqN/2(1, 0, . . . , 0) ≥ . . . ≥ logN = DKL(p‖q) ,
where qn := ( 1n , . . . ,
1
n ), and we have set Cq2(1, 0) = 1 as unit cost (corresponding
to 1 bit in the case of Kullback-Leibler divergence). Thus, intuitively the property
of the Kullback-Leibler divergence of being additive under coarse-graining might be
viewed as describing the minimal amount of processing costs that must be contained
in any cost function, because it cannot be reduced by changing the decision-making
process. Therefore, in the following we call cost functions that are proportional to
the Kullback-Leibler divergence simply informational costs.
In contrast to the previous section, in the definition of ≺q and its characteriza-
tions we have never used elementary computations on PΩ directly. This is due to
the fact that permutations do interact with the uncertainty relative to q, and there-
fore ≺q cannot be characterized by a finite number of elementary computations and
permutations on PΩ. However, we can still define elementary computations relative
to q by the inverse of Pigou-Dalton transfers Tε of the form (2.3) such that Tεp q p
for ε > 0, which is arguably the most basic form of how to generate uncertainty
with respect to q.
Even for small ε, a regular Pigou-Dalton transfer does not necessarily increase
uncertainty relative to q, because the similarity of the components now needs to be
considered with respect to q. Instead, we compare the components of the represen-
tation P = Λqp of p ∈ PΩ, and move some probability weight ε ≥ 0 from P (An) to
P (Am) whenever P (ω) ≤ P (ω′) for ω ∈ Am and ω′ ∈ An, by distributing ε evenly
among the elements in Am (see Figure 10), denoted by the transformation T˜ε. Here,
ε must be small enough such that the inequality 1α
pm
qm
= P (ω) ≤ P (ω′) = 1α pnqn is
invariant under T˜ε, which means that
(T˜εP )(ω) ≤ (T˜εP )(ω′) ⇔ 1
α
pm
qm
+
ε
|Am| ≤
1
α
pn
qn
− ε|An|
and therefore
ε ≤
pn
qn
− pmqm
1
qm
+ 1qn
. (2.23)
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Figure 10. Pigou-Dalton transfer relative to q. A distribution
p ∈ PΩ is transformed relative to q by first moving some amount
of weight ε ≥ 0 from P (An) to P (Am) where n,m are such that
P (ω) ≤ P (ω′) whenever ω ∈ Am and ω′ ∈ An, with ε small enough
such that this relation remains true after the transformation, and
then mapping the transformed distribution back to PΩ by Λ−1q (see
Definition 2.10).
By construction, T˜ε minimally increases uncertainty in PΩ˜ while staying in the
image of PΩ under Λq, by keeping the values of P constant in each partition, and
therefore Tε := Λ
−1
q T˜εΛq can be considered as the most basic way of how to increase
uncertainty relative to q.
Definition 2.10 (Elementary computation relative to q). We call a transformation
on PΩ of the form
Tε : p 7→ (p1, . . . , pm + ε, . . . , pn − ε, . . . , pN ) , (2.24)
with m,n such that pmqm ≤
pn
qn
, and ε satisfying (2.23), a Pigou-Dalton transfer
relative to q, and its inverse an elementary computation relative to q.
We are now in the position to state our final definition of a decision-making
process.
Definition 2.11 (Decision-making process). A decision-making process is a grad-
ual transformation
q −→ · · · −→ p′ −→ φ(p′) −→ · · · −→ p
of a prior q ∈ PΩ to a posterior p ∈ PΩ, such that each step decreases uncertainty
relative to q. This means that p is obtained from q by successive application of a
mapping φ between probability distributions on Ω, such that φ(p′) can be obtained
from p′ by finitely many elementary computations relative to q, in particular
q q p′ q φ(p′), 0 = Cq(q) < Cq(p′) < Cq(φ(p′)) , (2.25)
where Cq(p
′) quantifies the total costs of a distribution p′, and p′ q p means that
p′ ≺q p and p 6≺q p′.
In other words, a decision-making process can be viewed as traversing probability
space from prior q to posterior p by moving pieces of probability from one option
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to another option such that uncertainty is reduced relative to q, while expending a
certain amount of resources determined by the cost function Cq.
3. Bounded rationality
3.1. Bounded rational decision-making. In this section, we consider decision-
making processes that trade off utility against costs. Such decision-makers either
maximize a utility function subject to a constraint on the cost function, for example
an author of a scientific article that optimizes the article’s quality until a deadline is
reached, or minimizing the cost function subject to a utility constraint, for example
a high-school student that minimizes effort such that the requirement to pass a
certain class is achieved. In both cases, the decision-makers are called bounded
rational, since in the limit of no resource constraints they coincide with rational
decision-makers.
In general, depending on the underlying system, such an optimization process
might have additional process dependent constraints that are not directly given by
resource limitations, for example in cases when the optimization takes place in a
parameter space that has less degrees of freedom than the full probability space PΩ.
Abstractly, this is expressed by allowing the optimization process to search only in
a subset Γ ⊂ PΩ.
Definition 3.1 (Bounded rational decision-making process). Let U : Ω → R be
a given utility function, and Γ ⊂ PΩ. A decision-making process with prior q,
posterior p∗ ∈ Γ, and cost function Cq is called bounded rational if its posterior
satisfies
p∗ = argmax
p∈Γ
{
Ep[U ]
∣∣∣Cq(p) ≤ C0} , (3.1)
for a given upper bound C0 ≥ 0, or equivalently
p∗ = argmin
p∈Γ
{
Cq(p)
∣∣∣Ep[U ] ≥ U0} , (3.2)
for a given lower bound U0 ∈ R. In the case when the process constraints disappear,
i.e. if Γ = PΩ, then a bounded rational decision-maker is called bounded-optimal.
The equivalence between (3.1) and (3.2) is easily seen from the equivalent opti-
mization problem given by the formalism of Lagrange multipliers [25],
pβ := argmin
p∈Γ
(
Cq(p)− β Ep[U ]
)
= argmax
p∈Γ
(
Ep[U ]− 1β Cq(p)
)
, (3.3)
where the cost or utility constraint is expressed by a trade-off between utility and
cost, or cost and utility, with a trade-off parameter given by the Lagrange multiplier
β, which is chosen such that the constraint given by C0 or U0 is satisfied. It is easily
seen from the maximization problem on the right side of (3.3) that a larger value
of β decreases the weight of the cost term and thus allows for higher values of the
cost function. Hence, β parametrizes the amount of resources the decision-maker
can afford with respect to the cost function Cq, and, at least in non-trivial cases
(non-constant utilities) it is therefore a resource parameter with respect to Cq in
the sense of Definition 2.9. In particular, for β → 0, the decision-maker minimizes
its cost function irrespective of the expected utility, and therefore stays at the prior,
p0 = q, whereas β → ∞ makes the cost function disappear so that the decision-
maker becomes purely rational with a Dirac posterior centered on the optima x∗ of
the utility function U .
For example, in Figure 11 we can see how the posteriors (pβ)β≥0 of bounded-
optimal decision-makers with different cost functions for N = 3 and with utility
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 11. Paths of bounded-optimal decision-makers in P(Ω)
for N = 3. The straight lines in the background denote level sets
of expected utility, the solid lines are level sets of the cost functions,
and the dashed curves represent the paths (pβ)β≥0 of a bounded-
optimal decision-maker given by (3.3) with U = (0.8, 1.0, 0.4), prior
q = ( 13 ,
1
2 ,
1
6 ), and cost functions given by (a) Kullback-Leibler
divergence, (b) Tsallis relative entropy of order α = 3, and (c)
Burg relative entropy.
U = (0.8, 1.0, 0.4) leave a trace in probability space, by moving away from an
exemplary prior q = ( 13 ,
1
2 ,
1
6 ) and eventually arriving at the rational solution δ(0,1,0).
For informational costs (i.e. proportional to Kullback-Leibler divergence), β is a
resource parameter with respect to any cost function.
Proposition 3.2. If (pβ)β≥0 is a family of bounded-optimal posteriors given by
(3.3) with Cq(p) = DKL(p‖q), then β is a resource parameter with respect to any
cost function, in particular
q = p0 q pβ′ q pβ ∀β′, β with β′ < β . (3.4)
This generalizes a result in [78] to the case of non-uniform priors, by making use
of our new characterization (v) of ≺q, by which it suffices to show that the function
β 7→∑l−1i=1(pβ,i)↓ + aq(k, l)(pβ,l)↓ is monotonically increasing for all k, l specified in
Theorem 2.7 (see Proposition A.8 in the appendix for details). For simplicity, we
restrict ourselves to the case of the Kullback-Leibler divergence, however the proof
is analogous for cost functions of the form (2.20) with f being differentiable and
strictly convex on [0, 1] (so that f ′ is strictly monotonically increasing and thus
invertible on [0, 1], see [78] for the case of uniform priors).
Hence, for any β > 0, the posteriors (pβ′)β′<β of a bounded-optimal decision-
making process with the Kullback-Leibler divergence as cost function can be re-
garded as the steps of a decision-making process (i.e. satisfying (2.25)) with pos-
terior pβ , where each step optimally trades off utility against informational cost.
This means that with increasing β the posteriors pβ do not only decrease entropy
in the sense of the Kullback-Leibler divergence, but also in the sense of any other
cost function.
The important case of bounded-optimal decision-makers with informational costs
is termed information-theoretic bounded rationality [68, 92, 70] and is studied more
closely in the following sections.
3.2. Information-theoretic bounded rationality. For bounded-optimal decision-
making processes with informational costs the unconstrained optimization problem
(3.3) takes the form maxp∈PΩ F [p], where
F [p] := Ep[U ]− 1βDKL(p‖q) , (3.5)
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which has a unique maximum pβ , the bounded-optimal posterior given by
pβ(x) =
1
Zβ
q(x) eβU(x) (3.6)
with normalization constant Zβ . This form can easily be derived by finding the
zeros of the functional derivative of the objective functional (3.5) with respect to p
(with an additional normalization constraint), whereas the uniqueness follows from
the convexity of the mapping p 7→ DKL(p‖q). For the actual maximum of F we
obtain
Fβ := max
p∈PΩ
F [p] = F [pβ ] = 1
β
logZβ ,
so that pβ(x) = q(x) e
β(U(x)−Fβ).
Due to its analogy with physics, in particular thermodynamics (see e.g. [70]),
the maximization of (3.5) is known as the Free Energy principle of information-
theoretic bounded rationality, pioneered in [68, 92, 70], further developed in [29, 33],
and applied in recent studies of artificial systems, such as generative neural networks
trained by Markov chain Monte Carlo methods [38], or in reinforcement learning
as an adaptive regularization strategy [56, 35], as well as in recent experimental
studies on human behavior [71, 82]. Note that there is a formal connection of (3.5)
and the Free Energy principle of active inference [28], however, as discussed in [33,
Sec. 6.3], both Free Energy principles have conceptually different interpretations.
Example (Bayes rule as a bounded-optimal posterior). In Bayesian inference, the
parameter θ of the distribution pθ of a random variable Y is inferred from a given
dataset d = {y1, . . . , yN} of observations of Y by treating the parameter itself as a
random variable Θ with a prior distribution q(Θ). The parametrized distribution
of Y evaluated at an observation yi ∈ d given a certain value of Θ, i.e. p(yi|Θ=θ),
is then understood as a function of θ, known as the likelihood of the datapoint yi
under the assumption of Θ = θ. After seeing the dataset d, the belief about Θ is
updated by using Bayes rule
p(θ) =
q(θ)p(d|θ)
Eq(Θ)[p(d|Θ)] .
This takes the form of a bounded-optimal posterior (3.6) with β = N and utility
function given by the average log-likelihood per datapoint,
U(θ) :=
1
N
log p(d|θ) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
log(p(yi|θ)) ,
since then Bayes rule reads
p(θ) =
1
Z
q(θ) eβ U(θ). (3.7)
The corresponding Free Energy (3.5), that is maximized by (3.7),
F [p(Θ)] = Ep(Θ)[U(Θ)]− 1
β
DKL(p(Θ)‖q(Θ))
=
1
N
Ep(Θ)
[
log p(d|Θ)− log p(Θ)
q(Θ)
]
= − 1
N
DKL
(
p(Θ)‖q(Θ)p(d|Θ)) (3.8)
coincides with the variational Free Energy Fvar from Bayesian statistics. Indeed,
from (3.8) it is easy to see that F assumes its maximum when p(Θ) is proportional
to q(Θ)p(d|Θ), that is when p(Θ) is given by (3.7). In the literature, Fvar is
used in the variational characterization of Bayes rule, in cases when the form (3.7)
cannot be achieved exactly but instead is approximated by optimizing (3.8) over
the parameters ϑ of a parametrized distribution pϑ(Θ) [39, 61].
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Figure 12. Recursivity of the Free Energy under coarse-graining.
The decision about Z = (X,Y ) is equivalent to a two-step process
consisting of the decision about X and the decision about Y given
X. The objective function for the first step is the Free Energy of
the second step.
In the following section, we will see that the Free Energy F of a bounded rational
decision-making process satisfies a recursivity property, which allows the interpre-
tation of F as a certainty-equivalent.
3.3. The recursivity of F and the value of a decision problem. Consider
a bounded-optimal decision-maker with an informational cost function deciding
about a random variable Z with values in Ω that is decomposed into the random
variables X and Y , i.e. Z = (X,Y ). This decomposition can be understood as
a two-step process, where first a decision about a partition Ai of the full search
space Ω =
⋃
i∈I Ai is made, represented by a random variable X with values in I,
followed by a decision about Y inside the partition selected by X (see Figure 6).
Since p(Z) = p(X)p(Y |X), by the additivity of the Kullback-Leibler divergence
(Proposition A.7), we have
F [p(Z)] = Ep(Z)[U(Z)]− 1
β
DKL(p(Z)‖q(Z))
= Ep(X)
[
Ep(Y |X)[U(X,Y )]− 1
β
DKL
(
p(Y |X)‖q(Y |X))]− 1
β
DKL(p(X)‖q(X)) ,
and therefore, if Fβ [p(Y |X)] := Ep(Y |X)[U(X,Y )] − 1βDKL(p(Y |X)‖q(Y |X)) de-
notes the Free Energy of the second step,
F [p(X)p(Y |X)] = Ep(X)
[Fβ [p(Y |X)]]− 1
β
DKL(p(X)‖q(X)) . (3.9)
In particular, the Free Energy Fβ [p(Y |X)] of the second decision-step plays the
role of the utility function of the first decision-step (see Figure 12). In Equation
(3.9), the two decision-steps have the same resource parameter β, controlling the
strength of the constraint on the total informational costs
DKL(p(Z)‖q(Z)) = DKL(p(X)‖q(X)) + Ep(X)
[
DKL(p(Y |X)‖q(Y |X))
]
.
More generally, each step might have a separate information-processing constraint,
which requires two resource parameters β1 and β2, and results in the total Free
Energy
F [p(X), p(Y |X)] = Ep(X)
[Fβ2 [p(Y |X)]]− 1β1DKL(p(X)‖q(X)) .
Example. Consider a bounded-rational decision-maker with informational cost func-
tion and a utility function U defined on a set Ω = {z1, . . . , z4} with values as given
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Figure 13. The Free Energy as certainty-equivalent (Example
3.3). (a) Utility function U as a function of zi (top) and expected
utilities for the coarse-grained partitions {z1, z2} and {z3, z4} cor-
responding to the choices x1 and x2, respectively, for a bounded-
rational decision-maker with β = 0.9 (bottom). (b) The bounded
optimal probability distribution over xi (top) does not correspond
to the expected utilities in (a) but to the Free Energy of the second
decision-step, i.e. the decision about Y given X (bottom).
in Figure 13 and an information-processing bound of 0.2 bits (β ≈ 0.9). If we parti-
tion Ω into the disjoint subsets {z1, z2} and {z3, z4}, then the decision about Z can
be decomposed into two steps, Z = (X,Y ), the decision about X corresponding
to the choice of the partition and the decision about Y given X corresponding to
the choice of zi inside the given partition determined by X. According to Equation
(3.9), the choice of the partition X = xi is not in favor of the achieved expected
utility inside each partition, but of the Free Energy (see Figure 13).
Therefore, a bounded rational decision-maker that has the choice among decision-
problems ideally should base its decision not on the expected utility that might be
achieved but on the Free Energy of the subordinate problems. In other words, the
Free Energy quantifies the value of a decision-problem, that besides of the achieved
average utility also takes the information-processing costs into account.
3.4. Multi-task decision-making and the optimal prior. So far, we have
considered decision-making problems with utility functions defined on Ω only, mod-
elling a single decision-making task. This is extended to multi-task decision-making
problems by utility functions of the form U : W × Ω → R, (w, x) 7→ U(w, x),
where the additional variable w ∈ W represents the current state of the world.
Different world states w in general lead to different optimal decisions x∗(w) :=
argmaxx∈ΩU(w, x). For example, in a chess game the optimal moves depend on
the current board configurations the players are faced with.
The prior q for a bounded-rational multi-task decision-making problem may
either depend or not depend on the world state w ∈ W. In the first case, the
multi-task decision-making problem is just given by multiple single-task problems,
i.e. for each w ∈ W, q(X|W = w) and p(X|W = w) are the prior and posterior of
a bounded rational decision-making process with utility function x 7→ U(x,w), as
described in the previous sections. In the case when there is a single prior for all
world states w ∈ W, the Free Energy is
F [p(X|W )] = Ep(W )
[
Ep(X|W )[U(W,X)]− 1
β
DKL(p(X|W )‖q(X))
]
, (3.10)
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where p(W ) is a given world state distribution. Note that, for simplicity we assume
that β is independent of w ∈ W, which means that only the average information-
processing is constrained, in contrast to the information-processing being con-
strained for each world state which in general would result in β being a function
of w. Similarly to single-task decision-making (Equation (3.6)) the maximum of
(3.10) is achieved by
pβ(x|w) = 1
Zβ(w)
q(x) eβU(w,x) (3.11)
with normalization constant Zβ(w). Interestingly, the deliberation cost in (3.10)
depends on how well the prior was chosen to reach all posteriors without violating
the processing constraint. In fact, viewing the Free Energy (3.10) as a function of
both, posterior and prior, F [p(X|W )] = F [p(X|W ), q(X)], and optimizing for the
prior yields the marginal of the joint distribution p(W,X) = p(W )p(X|W ), i.e. the
mean of the posteriors for the different world states,
q∗(X) := argmaxq(X)F [p(X|W ), q(X)] = Ep(W )[p(X|W )] . (3.12)
Similarly to (3.6), Equation (3.12) follows from finding the zeros of the functional
derivative of the Free Energy with respect to q(X) (modified by an additional term
for the normalization constraint).
Optimizing the Free Energy F [p(X|W ), q(X)] for both prior and posterior can
be achieved by iterating Equations (3.11) and (3.12). This results in an alternating
optimization algorithm, originally developed independently by Blahut and Arimoto
to calculate the capacity of a memoryless channel [14, 9] (see [22] for a convergence
proof by Csisza´r and Tusna´dy). Note that
F [p(X|W ), q∗(X)] = Ep(W )p(X|W )[U(W,X)]− 1
β
I(W ;X) ,
in particular, that the information-processing cost is now given by the mutual
information I(W ;X) between the random variables W and X. In this form, we
can see that the Free Energy optimization with respect to prior and posterior is
equivalent to the optimization problem in classical rate distortion theory [86], where
U is given by the negative of the distortion measure.
Similarly as in rate-distortion theory, where compression algorithms are anayl-
ized with respect to the rate-distortion function, any decision-making system can
now be analyzed with respect to informational bounded-optimality. More precisely,
when plotting the achieved expected utility against the information-processing
resources of a bounded-rational decision-maker with optimal prior, we obtain a
pareto-optimality curve that forms an efficiency-frontier that cannot be surpassed
by any decision-making process (see Figure 14(c)).
3.5. Multi-task decision-making with unknown world state distribution.
A bounded rational decision-making process with informational cost and utility
U :W×Ω→ R that has an optimal prior q∗(X) given by the marginal (3.12) must
have perfect knowledge about the world state distribution p(W ). In contrast, here
we consider the case when the exact shape of the world state distribution is unknown
to the decision-maker and therefore has to be inferred from the already seen world
states. More precisely, we assume that the world state distribution is parametrized
by a parameter θ ∈ R, i.e. p(W ) = pθtrue(W ) for a given parametrized distribution
pθ(W ). Since the true parameter θtrue is unknown, θ is treated as a random variable
by itself, so that pθ(W ) = p(W |Θ = θ). After a dataset d = {w1, . . . , wN} ∈ WN
of samples from p(W |Θ = θtrue) has been observed the joint distribution of all
involved random variables can be written as
p(Θ, D,W,X) = p(Θ)p(D|Θ)p(W |Θ)p(X|D,W )
22 SEBASTIAN GOTTWALD, DANIEL A. BRAUN
where p(Θ) denotes the decision-maker’s prior belief about Θ, and p(D = d|Θ) =∏N
i=1 p(wi|Θ) is the likelihood of the previously observed world states. Therefore,
the resulting (multi-task) Free Energy (see Equation (3.10)) is given by
Ep(Θ)p(D|Θ)p(W |Θ)
[
Ep(X|D,W )[U(W,X)]− 1
β
DKL(p(X|D,W )‖q(X|D))
]
. (3.13)
It turns out that we obtain Bayesian inference as a byproduct of optimizing (3.13)
with respect to the prior q(X|D). Indeed, by calculating the functional derivative
with respect to q(X|D) of the Free Energy (3.13) plus an additional term for the
normalization constraint of q(X|D) (with Lagrange multiplier λ), we can see that
any distribution q∗(X|D) that optimizes (3.13) must satisfy
1
β
Ep(Θ)p(W |Θ)
[
p(D|Θ)p(X|D,W )
q∗(X|D)
]
+ λ = 0 ,
where λ ∈ R is chosen such that q∗(X|D=d) ∈ PΩ for any d ∈ WN . This is
equivalent to
q∗(X|D) = 1
ZD
Ep(Θ)
[
p(D|Θ)Ep(W |Θ)[p(X|D,W )]
]
,
where ZD denotes the normalization constant of q
∗(X|D), given by ZD = Ep(Θ)[p(D|Θ)],
since Ep(X|D,W )[1] = 1 as well as Ep(W |Θ)[1] = 1. Therefore, we obtain
q∗(X|D) = Ep∗(Θ|D)
[
Ep(W |Θ)[p(X|D,W )]
]
with p∗(Θ|D) as defined in Equation (3.14). Hence, we have shown
Proposition 3.3 (Optimality of Bayesian inference). The optimal prior q∗(X|D)
that maximizes (3.13) is given by q∗(X|D) = Ep∗(Θ|D)p(W |Θ)[p(X|D,W )], where
p∗(Θ|D) is the Bayes posterior
p∗(Θ|D) := p(Θ)p(D|Θ)
Ep(Θ)[p(D|Θ)] . (3.14)
4. Example: Absolute identification task with known and unknown
stimulus distribution
Consider a bounded rational decision-maker with a multi-task utility function U
such that for each w ∈ W, U(w, x) is non-zero for only one choice x ∈ Ω as shown
in Figure 14. Here, the decision and world spaces are both finite sets of N = 20
elements. The world state distribution p(W ) is given by a mixture of two Gaussian
distributions as shown in Figure 14(b). Due to some world states w ∈ W being
more likely than others, there are some choices x ∈ Ω that are less likely to be
optimal.
4.1. Known stimulus distribution. As can be seen in Figure 14(c) (dashed line),
here it is not ideal to have a uniform prior distribution, q(x) = 1N for all x ∈ Ω.
Instead, if the world state distribution is known perfectly and the prior has the
form suggested by Equation (3.12), i.e. q(x) =
∑
w p(w)pβ(x|w), then, as can
be seen in Figure 14(c) (solid line), achieving the same expected utility as with a
uniform prior requires less informational resources. In particular, the explicit form
of q∗ depends on the resource parameter β, see Figure 14(d). For low resource
availability (small β), only the choices that correspond to the most probable world
states are considered. However, for β →∞, we have
q∗(x) =
∑
w
p(W=w)δw,x = p(W=x) ,
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Figure 14. Absolute identification task with known world state
distribution. (a) Utility function, (b) world states distribution (a
mixture of two Gaussians), (c) expected utility as a function of
information-processing resources for a bounded-optimal decision-
maker with a uniform and with an optimal prior (the shaded region
cannot be reached by any decision-making process), and (d) exem-
plary optimal priors q∗(X) for different information-processing
bounds.
because here limβ→∞ pβ(x|w) = δw,x is the posterior of a rational decision-maker,
where δw,x denotes the Kronecker-δ (which is only non-zero if w=x). Hence, for
decision-makers with abundant information-processing resources (large β) the op-
timal prior q∗(X) approaches the form of the world state distribution p(W ) (since
here W = Ω).
4.2. Unknown stimulus distribution. In the case when the decision-maker has
to infer its knowledge about p(W ) from a set of samples d = {w1, . . . , wN}, we
know from Section 3.5 that this is optimally done via Bayesian inference. Here,
we assume a mixture auf two Gaussians as a parametrization of p(W ), so that
θ = (µ1, µ2, σ1, σ2), where µi and σi denote mean and standard-deviation of the
i-th component respectively (for simplicity, with fixed equal weights for the two
mixture components).
In Figure 15(a), we can see how different values of N affect the belief about
the world state distribution, p(W |D) = Ep(Θ|D)[p(W |Θ)], when p(Θ|D) is given
by the Bayes posterior (3.14) with a uniform prior belief p(Θ). The resulting ex-
pected utilities (averaged over samples from p(D|θtrue)) as functions of available
information-processing resources are displayed in Figure 15(b), which shows how
the performance of a bounded-rational decision-maker with optimal prior and per-
fect knowledge about the true world state distribution is approached by bounded
rational decision-makers with limited but increasing knowledge given by the sample
size N .
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Figure 15. Absolute identification task with unknown world state
distribution. (a) Average of inferred world state distributions for
different sizes N of datasets (standard-deviations across datasets
indicated by error bars). (b) Resulting utility-information curves
of a bounded-rational decision-maker with optimal prior that has
to infer the world state distribution from datasets with different
sizes N .
Abstractly, we can view Equation (3.14) as the bounded optimal solution to the
decision-making problem that starts with a prior p(Θ) and arrives at a posterior
p(Θ|D= d) after processing the samples in d = {w1, . . . , wN} (see also Example
3.2). In fact, the posteriors shown in Figure 15(a) satisfy the requirements for a
decision-making process with resource given by the number of datapoints N , when
averaged over p(D). In particular, by increasing N the posteriors contain less and
less uncertainty with respect to the preorder ≺ given by majorization. Accordingly,
if we plot the achieved expected utility against the number of samples, we obtain
an optimality curve similar to Figure 14(c) and Figure 15(b). In Figure 16 we can
see how Bayesian Inference outperforms Maximum Likelihood when evaluated with
respect to the average expected utility of a bounded-rational decision-maker with
2 bits of information-processing resources.
5. Discussion
In this work, we have developed a generalized notion of decision-making in terms
of uncertainty reduction. Based on the simple idea of transferring pieces of proba-
bility between the elements of a probability distribution, which we call elementary
computations, we have promoted a notion of uncertainty which is known in the
literature as majorization, a preorder ≺ on PΩ. Taking non-uniform initial distri-
butions into account, we extended the concept to the notion of relative uncertainty,
which corresponds to relative majorization ≺q. Despite of the large amount of re-
search that has been done on majorization theory, from the early works [65, 60, 36]
through further developments [79, 10, 8, 72, 19, 13, 62] to modern applications
[15, 41, 34], there is a lack of results on the more general concept of relative ma-
jorization. This does not seem to be due to a lack of interest, as can be seen from
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Figure 16. Optimality curve given by Bayesian inference. The
average expected utility as a function of N achieved by a bounded-
rational decision-maker that infers the world state distribution
with Bayes rule (3.14) forms an efficiency frontier that cannot be
surpassed by any other inference scheme, like for example Maxi-
mum Likelihood, when starting from the same prior belief about
the world.
the results [97, 80, 44, 54], but mostly because relative majorization looses some
of the appealing properties of majorization which makes it harder to deal with,
for example that permutations no longer leave the ordering ≺q invariant, in con-
trast to the case of a uniform prior. This restriction does, however, not affect our
application of the concept to decision-making, as permutations are not considered
as elementary computations, since they do not diminish uncertainty. By reducing
the non-uniform to the uniform case, we managed to prove new results on relative
majorization (Theorem 2.7), which then enabled new results in other parts of the
paper (Example 2.3, Propositions A.6, A.8), and allowed an intuitive interpreta-
tion of our final definition of a decision-making process (Definition 2.11) in terms
of elementary computations with respect to non-uniform priors (Definition 2.10).
More precisely, starting from stepwise elimination of uncertain options (Section
2.3), we have argued that decision-making can be formalized by transitions be-
tween probability distributions (Section 2.2), and arrived at the concept of decision-
making processes traversing probability space from prior to posterior by successively
moving pieces of probability between options such that uncertainty relative to the
prior is reduced (Section 2.1). Such transformations can be quantified by cost func-
tions, which we define as order-preserving functions with respect to ≺q and capture
the resource costs that must be expended by the process. We have shown (Proposi-
tions A.1, A.6) that many known generalized entropies and divergences, which are
examples of such cost functions (Examples 2.2 and 2.3), satisfy superadditivity with
respect to coarse-graining. This means that under such cost functions, decision-
making costs can potentially be reduced by a more intelligent search strategy, in
contrast to Kullback-Leibler divergence, which was characterized as the only addi-
tive cost function (Proposition A.7). There are plenty of open questions for further
investigation in that regard. First, it is not clear under which assumptions on the
cost functions Cq superadditivity could be improved to Cq(p) = αDKL(p‖q)+r(p, q)
with α > 0 and r(p, q) ≥ 0. Additionally, it would be an interesting challenge to
find sufficient conditions implying super-additivity that include more cost functions
than f -divergences. The field of information geometry might give further insights
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on the topic, since there are studies in similar directions, in particular charac-
terizations of divergence measures in terms of information monotonicity and the
data-processing inequality [43, 5, 6, 7]. One interesting result is the characteriza-
tion of Kullback-Leibler divergence as the single divergence measure being both an
f -divergence and a Bregman divergence.
In Section 3, bounded rational decision-makers were defined as decision-making
processes that are maximizing utility under constraints on the cost function, or
equivalently minimizing resource costs under a minimal utility requirement. In
the important case of additive cost functions (i.e. proportional to Kullback-Leibler
divergence), this leads to information-theoretic bounded rationality [68, 92, 70, 29,
33], which has precursors in the economic and game-theoretic literature [64, 66,
63, 101, 90, 42, 93, 91, 92, 46, 100, 58]. We have shown that the posteriors of a
bounded rational decision-maker with increasing informational constraints leave a
path in probability space that can itself be considered an anytime decision-making
process, in each step perfectly trading off utility against processing costs (Prop. 3.2).
In particular, this means that the path of a bounded rational decision-maker with
informational cost decreases uncertainty with respect to all cost functions, not just
Kullback-Leibler divergence. We have also studied the role of the prior in bounded
rational multi-task decision-making, where we have seen that imperfect knowledge
about the world state distribution leads to Bayesian inference as a byproduct, which
is in line with the characterization of Bayesian inference as minimizing prediction
surprise [69], but also demonstrates the wide applicability of the developed theory
of decision-making with limited resources.
Finally, in Section 4, we have presented the results of a simulated bounded ratio-
nal decision-maker solving an absolute identification task with and without knowl-
edge about the world state distribution. Additionally, we have seen that Bayesian
inference can be considered a decision-making process with limited resources by
itself, where the resource is given by the number of available datapoints.
6. Conclusion
To our knowledge, this is the first principled approach to decision-making based
on the intuitive idea of Pigou-Dalton-type probability transfers (elementary compu-
tations). Information-theoretic bounded rationality has been introduced by other
axiomatic approaches before [68, 63]. For example, in [68] a precise relation between
rewards and information value was derived by postulating that systems will choose
those states with high probability that are desirable for them. This leads to a direct
coupling of probabilities and utility, where utility and information inherit the same
structure, and only differ with respect to normalization—see [17] for similar ideas.
In contrast, we assume utility and probability to be independent objects a priori
that only have a strict relationship in the case of bounded-optimal posteriors. The
approach in [63] introduces Kullback-Leibler divergence as disutility for decision
control. Based on Hobson’s characterization [40], the authors argue that cost func-
tions should be monotonic with respect to uniform distributions (property (2.22))
and invariant under decomposition, which coincides with additivity under coarse-
graining (see Examples 2.2, 2.3). Both of these assumptions are special cases of our
more general treatment, where cost functions must be monotonic with respect to
elementary computations and are generally not restricted to being additive.
In the literature, there are many mechanistic models of decision-making that
instantiate decision-making processes with limited resources. Examples include re-
inforcement learning algorithms with variable depth [49, 50], Markov chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) models where only a certain number of samples can be evaluated
[100, 67, 38], and evidence accumulation models that accumulate noisy evidence
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until either a fixed threshold is reached [53, 75, 94, 76, 84] or where thresholds
are determined dynamically by explicit cost functions depending on the number of
allowed evidence accumulation steps [27, 24]. Many of these concrete models may
be described abstractly by resource parameterizations (Def. 2.9). More precisely,
in such cases the posteriors {pr}r∈I ⊂ Γ ⊂ PΩ are generated by an explicit process
with process constraints Γ and resource parameter r. For example, in diffusion
processes r may correspond to the amount of time allowed for evidence accumula-
tion, in Monte Carlo algorithms r may reflect the number of MCMC steps, and in
a reinforcement learning agent r may represent the number of forward-simulations.
If the resource restriction is described by a monotonic cost function r 7→ cr [27, 24],
then the process can be optimized by a maximization problem of the form
max
r∈I,p∈Γr
{
Ep[U ]− cr
}
= max
r∈I,p∈Γr
{
Ep[U ]
∣∣ cr ≤M} = max
p∈Γ
{
Ep[U ]
∣∣Cq(p) ≤M ′}
where M,M ′ are non-negative constants, Γr ⊂ Γ denotes the subset of probability
distributions with resource r, and Cq denotes a cost function such that r 7→ Cq(p)
for p ∈ Γr is strictly monotonically increasing. In particular, such cases can also be
regarded as bounded rational decision-making problems of the form (3.1).
Bounded rationality models in the literature come in a variety of flavors. In the
heuristics and biases paradigm the notion of optimization is often dismissed in its
entirety [31], even though decision-makers still have to have a notion of options
being better or worse, for example in order to adapt their aspiration levels in a sat-
isficing scheme [88]. We have argued that from an abstract normative perspective
we can formulate satisficing in probabilistic terms, such that one could investigate
the efficiency of heuristics within this framework. Another prominent approach to
bounded rationality is given by systems capable of decision-making about decision-
making, i.e. meta-decision-making. Explicit decision-making processes composed
of two decision steps have been studied, for example, in the reinforcement learning
literature [49, 50, 73, 98], where the first step is represented by a meta decision
about whether a cheap model-free or a more expensive model-based learning algo-
rithm is used in the second step. The meta step consists of a trade-off between the
estimated utility against the decision-making costs of the second decision step. In
the information-theoretic framework of bounded rationality this could be seen as a
natural property of multi-step decision-making and the recursivity property (3.9)
from which follows that the value of a decision-making problem is given by its Free
Energy, that besides of the achieved utility also takes the corresponding processing
costs into account. Another prominent approach to bounded rationality is compu-
tational rationality [58] where the focus lies on finding bounded-optimal programs
that solve constrained optimization problems presented by the decision-maker’s
architecture and the task environment. As described above, such architectural con-
straints could be represented by a process dependent subset Γ ⊂ PΩ, and in fact
our resource costs could be included into such a subset Γr as well. From this point
of view, both frameworks would look for bounded-optimal solutions in that the
search space is first restricted and then the best solution in the restricted search
space is found. However, our search space would consist of distributions describing
probabilistic input-output maps, whereas the search space of programs would be
far more detailed.
The notion of decision-making presented in this work, intuitively developed from
the basic concept of uncertainty reduction given by elementary computations and
motivated by the simple idea of progressively eliminating options, on the one hand
provides a promising theoretical playground that is open for further investigation
(e.g. superadditivity of cost functions and minimality of relative entropy), poten-
tially providing new insights into the connection between the fields of rationality
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theory and information theory, and on the other hand serves the purpose of a
general framework to describe and analyze all kinds of decision-making processes
(e.g. in terms of bounded-optimality).
Appendix A. Proofs of technical results from Sections 2 and 3
Proposition A.1 (Superadditivity of generalized entropies under coarse-graining,
Example 2.2). All cost functions of the form
C(p) =
∑N
i=1
f(pi) , (A.1)
with f (strictly) convex and differentiable on [0, 1], and f(1) = 0, are superadditive
with respect to coarse-graining, that is
C(Z) ≥ C(X) + C(Y |X)
whenever Z = (X,Y ), and C(X) := C(p(X)) and C(Y |X) := Ep(X)[C(p(Y |X))].
Proof. As we will see in the following proof, strict convexity is not needed for
superadditivity, but it is required for the definition of a cost function. First, since∑
i pi = 1, notice that we can always redefine the convex function f in (A.1) by
fc(t) := f(t)−c(t−1) for an arbitrary constant c ∈ R without changing C(p) for all
p ∈ PΩ. Hence, without loss of generality, we may assume f ′(1) = 0, so that t = 1
is a global minimum of f (since f(t) ≥ f(1)+(t−1) f ′(1) = f(1) due to convexity).
Since C is symmetric, superadditivity under coarse-graining is equivalent to
C(p1, . . . , pN ) ≥ C(p1 + p2, p3, . . . , pN ) + (p1+p2)C( p1p1+p2 ,
p2
p1+p2
) (A.2)
This simply follows by induction, since (A.2) corresponds to the partitioning Ω =⋃N−1
j=1 Aj with A1 = {x1, x2} and Aj = {xj+1} for all j = 2, . . . , N − 1 (see also [3,
2.3.5]). In terms of f , (A.2) reads
f(p1) + f(p2) ≥ f(p1 + p2) + (p1 + p2)
(
f
(
p1
p1+p2
)
+ f
(
p2
p1+p2
))
By setting u = p1 + p2 and v =
p1
p1+p2
, this is equivalent to
f(uv) + f(u(1− v)) ≥ f(u) + u (f(v) + f(1− v)) (A.3)
for all u, v ∈ [0, 1]. Writing Fv(u) := f(uv)+f(u(1−v))−f(u)−u (f(v)+f(1−v))
and noting that Fv(0) ≥ 0 and Fv(1) = 0, it suffices to show that F ′v(u) ≤ 0,
which shows that Fv is monotonically decreasing from Fv(0) to Fv(1) = 0 and thus
Fv(u) ≥ 0 for all u ∈ [0, 1]. We have for all v, u ∈ [0, 1]
F ′v(u) = vf
′(uv) + (1−v)f ′(u(1−v))− f ′(u)− f(v)− f(1−v)
By the symmetry of Fv under the replacement of v by 1−v, without loss of gen-
erality, we may assume that v ≤ 12 , so that uv ≤ u(1−v) ≤ u. Since f is convex,
f ′ is monotonically increasing on [0, 1], and thus f ′(uv) ≤ f ′(u(1−v) ≤ f ′(u). In
particular,
f ′(u) = vf ′(u) + (1− v)f ′(u) ≥ vf ′(uv) + (1− v)f ′(u(1−v))
and thus, since f(v) + f(1−v) ≥ 0, it follows that F ′v(u) ≤ 0, which completes the
proof. 
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Proposition A.2 (Characterization of Shannon entropy, Example 2.2). If a cost
function C is additive under coarse-graining, that is if C(Z) = C(X) + C(Y |X)
with the notation from Proposition A.1, then
C = −αH
for some α ≥ 0, i.e. C is proportional to the negative Shannon entropy −H.
Proof. Since uniform distributions over N options are majorized by uniform distri-
butions over N ′ < N options (see (2.7)), it follows for any cost function C that the
function f defined by f(N) := C
(
1
N , . . . ,
1
N
)
is monotonically increasing. There-
fore the claim follows directly from Shannon’s proof [85], where he shows that this
monotonicity, additivity under coarse-graining, and continuity determine Shannon
entropy up to a constant factor. 
Proposition A.3 (Prop.2.5). The uniform distribution ( 1N , . . . ,
1
N ) is the unique
minimal element in PΩ with respect to ≺, i.e.(
1
N , . . . ,
1
N
) ≺ p ∀p ∈ PΩ . (A.4)
Proof. For the proof of (A.4), let (Πi)
N
i=1 be the family of all cyclic permutations
of the N entries of a probability vector p, such that
Π1(p) = p, Π2(p) = (pN , p1, . . . , pN−1), . . . , ΠN (p) = (p2, . . . , pN , p1) .
It follows that
∑N
i=1 Πi(p) = e for all p ∈ PΩ, where e = (1, . . . , 1) as above,
and therefore the uniform distribution 1N e is given by a convex combination of
permutations of p, so that (iv) in Theorem 2.3 implies 1N e ≺ p. There is many
different ways to prove uniqueness. A direct way is to assume there exists q ∈ P
with q ≺ 1N e for all p ∈ PΩ, so that by (iii) in Theorem 2.3 there exists a stochastic
matrix A with 1N eA = q. But since eA = e (A stochastic), it follows that q =
1
N e.
An indirect way would be to use that if q ≺ p for all p ∈ PΩ, then from Example
2.2 we know that this implies H(q) ≥ H(p) for all p ∈ PΩ, where H denotes the
Shannon entropy, simply because −H is a cost function. In particular, q maximizes
H and therefore coincides with the uniform distribution 1N e. 
Proposition A.4 (Equivalence of (i), (iii), (v) in Theorem 2.7). The following are
equivalent
(i) p′ ≺q p, i.e. p′ contains more uncertainty relative to q than p (Def. 2.6)
(iii) p′ = pA for a q-stochastic matrix A, i.e. Ae = e and qA = q
(v)
∑l−1
i=1(p
′
i)
↓ + aq(k, l)(p′l)
↓ ≤ ∑l−1i=1 p↓i + aq(k, l)p↓l for all α∑l−1i=1 q↓i ≤ k ≤
α
∑l
i=1 q
↓
i and 1 ≤ l ≤ N , where aq(k, l) := ( kα −
∑l−1
i=1 q
↓
i )/q
↓
l , and the
arrows indicate that (p↓i /q
↓
i )i is ordered decreasingly.
Proof. We will make use of the fact that Λq : PΩ → PΩ˜ has a left inverse Λ−1q :
Λq(PΩ) → PΩ satisfying Λ−1q Λq = I, where I denotes the identity on PΩ. This can
be verrified by simply multiplying the corresponding matrices, given by
Λ−1q =

1 · · · 1 0 · · · · · · · · · · · · 0
0 · · · 0 1 · · · 1 0 · · · 0
. . .
. . .
0 · · · · · · · · · · · · 0 1 · · · 1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
|A1|+···+|AN |=α
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and
Λq =
1
α

1
q1
0 · · · 0 0
...
...
...
...
1
q1
0 · · · 0 0
. . .
0 0 · · · 0 1qN
...
...
...
...
0 0 · · · 0 1qN


α ,
and noting that, by definition, α qi = |Ai|.
Characterization (v) follows from (vi) of Theorem 2.3 and Definition 2.6, since
p′ ≺q p if and only if
k∑
i=1
(Λqp
′)↓i ≤
k∑
i=1
(Λqp)
↓
i
for all 1 ≤ k ≤ α− 1, from which (v) is an immediate consequence.
(i)⇒ (iii): Assuming that p′ ≺q p we have Λqp′ ≺ Λqp and therefore, by (iii) in
Theorem 2.3, there exists a doubly stochastic matrix B such that Λqp
′ = BTΛqp.
With AT := Λ−1q B
TΛq it follows that
Ae = ΛTq B(Λ
−1
q )
T e = (Λ−1q )
TBe = (Λ−1q )
T e = e ,
where we have used that (Λ−1q )
T e = e and ΛTq e = e which is easy to check, and
Be = e from B being a stochastic matrix. Note that, by slightly abusing notation,
here e is always the constant vector (1, . . . , 1) irrespective of the number of its
entries (N or α, depending on which space the operator is defined). Moreover, we
have
AT q = Λ−1q B
TΛqq =
1
α Λ
−1
q B
T e = 1α Λ
−1
q e = q
where we have used that Λqq by definition is the uniform distribution on PΩ˜, i.e.
Λqq =
1
α e, and therefore also Λ
−1
q e = α q. In particular, since also Aij ≥ 0
(B,Λq,Λ
−1
q have non-negative entries), it follows that A is a q-stochastic matrix
such that p′ = AT p = pA.
(i) ⇐ (iii): Similarly, if A is a q-stochastic matrix with p′ = pA, then Λqp′ =
BTΛqp, where B := (Λ
−1
q )
TAΛTq satisfies B
T e = αΛqA
T q = αΛqq = e and Be =
(Λ−1q )
TAe = (Λ−1q )
T e = e, where we have used that Λ−1q e = αq, Λqq =
1
α e,
ΛTq e = e, and (Λ
−1
q )
T e = e. In particular, since also Bij ≥ 0, B is doubly stochastic
and therefore Λqp
′ ≺ Λqp, i.e. p′ ≺q p. 
Proposition A.5 (Prop. 2.8). The prior q ∈ PΩ is the unique minimal element in
PΩ with respect to ≺q, that is q ≺q p for all p ∈ PΩ.
Proof. Let p ∈ PΩ, and let P := Λqp denote its representation in PΩ˜. Then Q ≺ P
by Proposition A.3 (uniform distributions are minimal) and therefore q = Λ−1q Q ≺q
p, in particular q is minimal with respect to ≺q. For uniqueness, let p′ be possibly
another minimal element. Then p′ ≺q q and therefore by (iii) in Theorem 2.7 there
exists a q-stochastic matrix A with p′ = qA. But since A is q-stochastic, qA = q,
and thus p′ = q. 
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Proposition A.6 (Example 2.3: Superadditivity of f -divergences under coarse–
graining). All relative cost functions of the form
Cq(p) =
N∑
i=1
qi f
(pi
qi
)
, (A.5)
with f (strictly) convex and differentiable on [0, 1], and f(1) = 0, are superadditive
with respect to coarse-graining, that is, for Z = (X,Y ),
Cq(Z) ≥ Cq(X) + Cq(Y |X)
whenever Cq(X) := Cq(X)(p(X)) and Cq(Y |X) := Ep(X)[Cq(Y |X)(p(Y |X))], which
for cost functions that are symmetric with respect to permutations of ((pi, qi))i=1,...,N
(such as (2.20)) is equivalent to
Cq(p) ≥ C(q1+q2,q3...,qN )(p1+p2, p3, . . . , pN )+(p1+p2)C( q1q1+q2 , q2q1+q2 )
(
p1
p1+p2
, p2p1+p2
)
.
(A.6)
Proof. This is a simple corollary to Proposition A.1, after establishing the following
interesting property of cost functions of the form (A.5):
Cq(p) = CΛqq(Λqp) (A.7)
where Λq denotes the representation mapping defined in Section 2.3 that maps q
to a uniform distribution on an elementary decision space Ω˜ of |Ω˜| = α elements,
given by (Λqp)(ω) =
1
α
pi
qi
whenever ω ∈ Ai, where {Ai}Ni=1 is a disjoint partition of
Ω˜ such that |Ai| = α qi. Equation (A.7) then follows from
CΛqq(Λqp) =
∑
ω∈Ω˜
(Λqq)(ω) f
(
(Λqp)(ω)
(Λqq)(ω)
)
=
1
α
N∑
i=1
∑
w∈Ai
f
(
pi
qi
)
=
N∑
i=1
qif
(
pi
qi
)
,
where we have used that
∑
w∈Ai 1 = |Ai| = αqi. Hence the case of a non-uniform
prior reduces to the case of a uniform prior, which was shown in Proposition A.1. 
Proposition A.7 (Example 2.3: Characterization of Kullback-Leibler divergence).
If Cq is a continuous cost function relative to q that is additive under coarse-
graining, that is Cq(Z) = Cq(X) + Cq(Y |X) in the notation of Proposition A.6,
then
Cq(p) = αDKL(p‖q) (A.8)
for some α ≥ 0, where DKL(p‖q) denotes the Kullback-Leibler divergence DKL(p‖q) =∑
i pi log(pi/qi).
Proof. First, we show that any relative cost function that is additive under coarse-
graining satisfies (2.22), the monotonicity property for uniform distributions: If
f(M,N) denotes the cost CuN (uM ) of a uniform distribution uM over M elements
relative to a uniform distribution uN over N ≥M elements, then
f(M ′, N) ≤ f(M,N) ∀M ≤M ′ ≤ N ,
f(M,N) ≥ f(M,N ′) ∀M ≤ N ′ ≤ N . (A.9)
Once (A.9) has been established, then (A.8) goes back to a result by Hobson [40] (see
also [63]), whose proof is a modification of Shannon’s axiomatic characterization
[85].
The first property in (A.9) actually is true for all relative cost functions: For
q = uN with N = |Ω|, we have p′ ≺q p iff p′ ≺ p and thus the first property follows
from (2.7), and the same is true in the case when N < |Ω|, since we always assume
that p′, p are absolutely continuous with respect to q, which allows to redefine Ω to
only contain the N options covered by q.
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For the proof of the second property in (A.9), we let the random variable X
indexing the partitions E1, E2 of Ω, where E1 denotes the support of uN ′ and
E2 = Ω\E1 its complement, and Y representing the choice inside of the selected
partition Ei given X = i. Letting q(Z) = uN , and p(Z) = uN ′ , then it follows
from addivity under coarse-graining that Cq(X)(p(X)) = CuN (uN ′) = f(N
′, N),
and letting p(Z) = uM , we obtain
f(M,N) = Cq(X)(p(X)) + C(Y |X = 1) = f(N ′, N) + f(M,N ′) ,
since p(X=1) = 1, p(X=2) = 0, and C(Y |X = 1) = CuN′ (uM ). Therefore it
follows that f(M,N) ≥ f(M,N ′). 
Proposition A.8 (Prop. 3.2). If (pβ)β≥0 is a family of bounded-optimal posteriors
given by (3.3) with cost function Cq(p) = DKL(p‖q), then β is a resource parameter
with respect to any cost function, in particular
q = p0 q pβ′ q pβ ∀β′, β with β′ < β . (A.10)
Proof. Part of the proof generalizes a result in [78] to the case of a non-uniform
prior q, by making use of our new characterization (v) of ≺q, by which it suffices
to show that β 7→∑l−1i=1(pβ,i)↓+ aq(k, l)(pβ,l)↓ is an increasing function of β for all
k, l specified in Theorem 2.7. By (3.6) below, we have
∂βpβ,i = ∂β
(
1
Zβ
qi e
βUi
)
= pβ,i(Ui − Epβ [U ]) ,
where Ui are the decreasingly arranged utility values U(x) for x ∈ Ω, so that also
pβ,i/qi is arranged decreasingly. From the ordering of the Ui, it is easy to see that(
k∑
i=1
piUi + pk+1Uk+1
)
k∑
j=1
pj ≤
k∑
i=1
piUi
 k∑
j=1
pj + pk+1

with the notation pk := pβ,k, from which it follows that Sk :=
∑k
i=1 pˆkUi with pˆk :=
pk/
∑k
j=1 pj , is monotonically decreasing in k (with SN = Ep[U ]), and therefore
k∑
i=1
pi(Ui − Ep[U ]) =
(
k∑
i=1
pˆiUi − Ep[U ]
)
k∑
j=1
pj = (Sk − SN )
k∑
j=1
pj ≥ 0
for all k ≤ N . Hence, it suffices to show that ∑l−1i=1 xi + txl ≥ 0 if ∑ki=1 xi ≥ 0 for
all k and t ∈ [0, 1]. If xl ≥ 0, there is nothing to show, and if xl < 0, we have∑l−1
i=1 xi + txl ≥
∑l
i=1 xi ≥ 0, which completes the proof of pβ′ ≺q pβ .
It remains to see that pβ 6≺q pβ′ . This follows again from (v) in Theorem 2.7,
more precisely from the requirement that pβ,1 ≤ pβ′,1 if pβ ≺q pβ′ , after establishing
that β 7→ Z−1β eβU1 is monotonically increasing. For the latter, note that since the
Ui are ordered decreasingly,
∑N
i=1 Uiqie
βUi ≤ U1
∑N
i=1 qie
βUi from which follows
that ∂β(Z
−1
β e
βU1) ≥ 0, which completes the proof. 
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